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Abstract
We design new differentially private algorithms for the Euclidean k-means problem, both
in the centralized model and in the local model of differential privacy. In both models, our
algorithms achieve significantly improved error guarantees than the previous state-of-the-art.
In addition, in the local model, our algorithm significantly reduces the number of interaction
rounds.
Although the problem has been widely studied in the context of differential privacy, all of
the existing constructions achieve only super constant approximation factors. We present—for
the first time—efficient private algorithms for the problem with constant multiplicative error.
Furthermore, we show how to modify our algorithms so they compute private corsets for k-means
clustering in both models.
1 Introduction
Clustering, and in particular center based clustering, are central problems in unsupervised learning.
Several cost objectives have been intensively studied for center based clustering, such as minimizing
the sum or the maximum of the distances of the input points to the centers. Most often the data
is embedded in Euclidean space and the distances that we work with are Euclidean distances.
In particular, one of the most studied center based clustering problem is the Euclidean k-means
problem. In this problem we are given a set of n input points in Rd and our goal is to find k
centers that minimize the sum of squared distances between each input point to its nearest center.1
When privacy is not a concern one usually solves this problem by running Lloyd’s algorithm [34]
initialized by k-means++ [6]. This produces k-centers of cost that is no worse than O(log k) times
the cost of the optimal solution and its performance in practice is typically better.
The huge applicability of k-means clustering, together with the increasing awareness and de-
mand for user privacy, motivated the study of privacy preserving k-means algorithms. It is especially
desirable to achieve differential privacy [20], a privacy notion which has been widely adopted by
the academic community as well as big corporations like Google, Apple, and Microsoft. Indeed,
constructions of differentially private k-means algorithms have received a lot of attention over the
last 14 years [14, 38, 22, 25, 37, 45, 41, 43, 24, 8, 39, 29]. In this work we design new differentially
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1The sum of squares is nice to work with since we do not have to compute square roots. Furthermore, for a given
cluster its center of mass is the minimizer of the sum of the squared distances. These properties make k-means to be
the favorite for center based clustering.
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private k-means algorithms, both for the centralized model (where a trusted curator collects the
sensitive information and analyzes it with differential privacy) and for the local model (where each
respondent randomizes her answers to the data curator to protect her privacy). In both models,
our algorithms offer significant improvements over the previous state-of-the-art.
Before describing our new results, we define our setting more precisely. Consider an input
database S = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ (Rd)n containing n points in Rd, where every point xi ∈ S is the
(sensitive) information of one individual. The goal is to identify a set of k centers C = {c1, . . . , ck}
in Rd approximately minimizing the following quantity, referred to as the cost of the centers
costS(C) =
n∑
i=1
min
j∈[k]
‖xi − cj‖22.
The privacy requirement is that the output of our algorithm (the set of centers) does not reveal
information that is specific to any single individual. Formally,
Definition 1.1 ([20]). A randomized algorithm A : Xn → Y is (ε, δ) differentially private if for
every two databases S, S′ ∈ Xn that differ in one row, and every set T ⊆ Y , we have
Pr[A(S) ∈ T ] ≤ eε · Pr[A(S′) ∈ T ] + δ.
Combining the utility and privacy requirements, we are seeking for a computationally efficient
differentially private algorithm that identifies a set of k centers C such that w.h.p. costS(C) ≤
γ · OPTS +η, where OPTS is the optimal cost. We want γ and η to be as small as possible, as
a function of the number of input points n, the dimension d, the number of centers k, the failure
probability β, and the privacy parameters ε, δ.
We remark that a direct consequence of the definition of differential privacy is that, unlike in
the non-private literature, every private algorithm for this problem must have additive error η > 0.
In fact, η must grow with Λ2, where Λ bounds the diameter of the space of input points. To
see this, consider k + 1 locations p1, . . . , pk+1 at pairwise distances Λ, and consider the following
two neighboring datasets. The first dataset S1 contains n − k + 1 copies of p1, and (one copy of)
p2, . . . , pk. The second dataset S2 is obtained from S1 by replacing pk with pk+1. Since in both
cases there are only k distinct input points, the optimal cost for each of these datasets is zero. On
the other hand, By the constraint of differential privacy, the set of centers we compute essentially
cannot be affected by this change. Therefore we expect that at least on one of these instances we
will have error Ω(Λ2). In what follows we will therefore assume that input points come from the
d-dimensional ball B(0,Λ), and we assume that Λ = 1 in the introduction.
Traditionally, in the non-private literature, the goal is to minimize the multiplicative error
γ, with the current state-of-the-art (non-private) algorithm achieving multiplicative error of γ =
6.357 (with no additive error) [2]. In contrast, in spite of the long line of works on private k-
means [14, 38, 22, 25, 37, 45, 41, 43, 24, 8, 39, 29], all of the existing polynomial time private
algorithms for the problem obtained only a super constant multiplicative error. We present the first
polynomial time differentially private algorithm for the Euclidean k-means problem with constant
multiplicative error, while essentially keeping the additive error the same as in previous state-of-
the-art results. See Table 1 for a comparison.
1.1 Locally private k-means
In the local model of differential privacy (LDP), there are n users and an untrusted server. Each user
i is holding a private input item xi (a point in Rd in our case), and the server’s goal is to compute
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Reference Model Multiplicative Error Additive Error
Feldman et al. (2009) [22] DP O(
√
d) O˜
(
(kd)2d
)
Nock et al. (2016) [41] DP O(log k) O
(
n/ log2 n
)
Feldman et al. (2017) [24] DP O(k log n) O˜
(√
d · k1.5
)
Balcan et al. (2017) [8] DP O(log3 n) O˜
(
d+ k2
)
Nissim and Stemmer (2018) [39] DP O(k) O˜
(
d0.51 · k1.51)
This work DP O(1) O˜
(
k1.01 · d0.51 + k1.5)
Nissim and Stemmer (2018) [39]
LDP
O(k log n) rounds
O(k) O˜
(
n0.67 · d1/3 · √k
)
This work
LDP
O(1) rounds
O(1) O˜
(
n0.67 · d1/3 · k2)
Ahmadian et al. (2017) [2] Non-private 6.357 0
Table 1: Algorithms for k-means in the d-dimensional Euclidean space. DP denotes the standard (centralized)
model of differential privacy, and LDP denotes the local model of differential privacy. Here n is the number of
input points, k is the number of desired centers, and d is the dimension. For simplicity, we assume that the input
points come from the unit ball, and omit the dependency in ε, as well as logarithmic factors in k, n, d, β, δ, from
the additive error.
some function of the inputs (approximate the k-means in our case). However, in this model, the
users do not send their data as is to the server. Instead, every user randomizes her data locally,
and sends a differentially private report to the server, who aggregates all the reports. Informally,
the privacy requirement is that the input of user i has almost no effect on the distribution on the
messages that user i sends to the server. This is the model used by Apple, Google, and Microsoft
in practice to ensure that private data never reaches their servers in the clear.
With increasing demand from the industry, the local model of differential privacy is now becom-
ing more and more popular. Nevertheless, the only currently available k-means algorithm under
LDP (with provable utility guarantees) is that of Nissim and Stemmer [39], with O(k) multiplicative
error. We present a new LDP algorithm for the k-means achieving constant multiplicative error.
In addition, the protocol of [39] requires O(k log n) rounds of interaction between the server and
the users, whereas our protocol uses only O(1) rounds. See Table 1 for a comparison.
1.2 Classical algorithms are far from being private
We highlight some of the challenges that arise when trying to construct private variants for existing
(non-private) algorithms. Recall for example the classical (non-private) Lloyd’s algorithm, where in
every iteration the input points are grouped by their proximity to the current centers, and the points
in every group are averaged to obtain the centers for the next round. One barrier for constructing
a private analogue for this algorithm is that, with differential privacy, the privacy parameters
deteriorate with number of (private) computations that we apply to the dataset. So, even if we were
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able to construct a private analogue for every single iteration, our approximation guarantees would
not necessarily improve with every iteration. In more details, composition theorems for differential
privacy [21] allow for applying O(n2) private computations before exhausting the privacy budget
completely. Lloyd’s algorithm, however, might have a much larger number of iterations (exponential
in n in worst case). Even the bounds on it smoothed complexity are much larger than n2 (currently
≈ n32 is known [5]). In addition, classical techniques for reducing the number of iterations often
involve computations which are highly sensitive to a change of a small number of input points. For
example, recall that in k-means++ [6] the initial k centers (with which Lloyd’s algorithm is typically
initiated) are chosen from the data points themselves, an operation which cannot be applied as is
when the data points are private.
These challenges are reflected in the recent work of Nock et al. [41], who constructed a private
variant for the k-means++ algorithm. While their private algorithm achieves a relatively low
multiplicative error of O(log k), their additive error is O˜(n). In this work we are aiming for additive
error at most polylogarithmic in n (note that having additive error of n is meaningless, since if
points come from the unit ball then every choice of k centers have error at most O(n)).
1.3 On the evolution of private k-means algorithms
The starting point of our work is the observation that by combining ideas from three previous
works [25, 8, 39] we can obtain a differentially private k-means algorithm (in the centralized model)
with constant multiplicative error, but with a relatively large additive error which is polynomial
in n (as we will see in Section 1.4). Most of our technical efforts (in the centralized model) are
devoted to reducing the additive error while keeping the multiplicative error constant. We now
describe the results of [25, 8, 39].
Gupta et al. [25] constructed a private variant for the classical local search heuristic [7, 32]. In
this local search heuristic for k-means, we start with an arbitrary choice of k centers, and then
proceed in iterations, where in every iteration we replace one of our current centers with a new
one, so as to reduce the k-means cost. Gupta et al. [25] constructed a private variant of the local
search heuristic by instantiating the (generally inefficient) exponential mechanism of McSherry and
Talwar [35] in order to privately choose a replacement center in every step. While the algorithm
of Gupta et al. [25] obtains superb approximation guarantees, its runtime is exponential in the
representation length of domain elements.2 In particular, the algorithm is not applicable to the
Euclidean space.
Balcan et al. [8] suggested the following strategy in order to adopt the techniques of Gupta et
al. [25] to the Euclidean space. First, identify (in a differentially private manner) a small set Y ⊆ Rd
of candidate centers such that Y contains a subset of k candidate centers with low k-means cost.
Then, apply the techniques of Gupta et al. in order to choose k centers from Y . If |Y | = poly(n),
then the resulting algorithm would be efficient. As the algorithm of Gupta et al. has very good
approximation guarantees, the bottleneck for the approximation error in the algorithm of Balcan
et al. is in the construction of Y . Namely, the overall error is dominated by the error of the best
choice of k centers out of Y (compared to the cost of the best choice of k centers from Rd). Balcan
et al. then constructed a differentially private algorithm for identifying a set of candidate centers
Y based on the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform [31]. However, their construction gives a set of
2The algorithm of [25] obtains O(1) multiplicative error and O˜(k2d) additive error. It is designed for a discrete
version of the problem, where input points come from a finite set V , and the running time of their algorithm is at
least linear in |V |.
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candidate centers such that the best choice of k centers from these candidates is only guaranteed
to have a multiplicative error of O(log3 n), leading to a private k-means algorithm with O(log3 n)
multiplicative error.
A different approach to obtain a good k-means clustering privately is via algorithms for the
1-cluster problem, where given a set on n input points in Rd and a parameter t ≤ n, the goal
is to identify a ball of the smallest radius that encloses at least t of the input points. It was
shown by Feldman et al. [24] that the Euclidean k-means problem can be reduced to the 1-cluster
problem, by iterating the 1-cluster algorithm multiple times to find several balls that cover most
of the data points. Feldman et al. then applied their reduction to the private 1-cluster algorithm
of [40], and obtained a private k-means algorithm with multiplicative error (k log n). Following
that work, Nissim and Stemmer [39] presented an improved algorithm for the 1-cluster problem
which, when combined with the reduction of Feldman et al., gives a private k-means algorithm with
multiplicative error O(k).
1.4 Our techniques
Let S ∈ (Rd)n be an input database and let u∗1, . . . , u∗k ∈ Rd denote an optimal set of centers for S.
We use S∗j ⊆ S to denote the cluster induced by u∗j , i.e.,
S∗j = {x ∈ S : j = argmin`‖x− u∗`‖}.
We observe that the techniques that Nissim and Stemmer [39] applied to the 1-cluster problem
can be used to privately identify a set of candidate centers Y that “captures” every “big enough”
cluster j. Informally, let j be such that |S∗j | ≥ na (for some constant a > 0). We will construct a
set of candidate centers Y such that there is a candidate center yj ∈ Y that is “close enough” to the
optimal center u∗j , in the sense that the cost of yj w.r.t. S
∗
j is at most a constant times bigger than
the cost of u∗j . That is, costS∗j ({yj}) = O
(
costS∗j ({u∗j})
)
. By simply ignoring clusters of smaller
sizes, this means that Y contains a subset D of k candidate centers such that
costS(D) ≤ O(1) ·OPTS +k · na.
There are two reasons for the poly(n) additive error incurred here. First, this technique ef-
fectively ignores every cluster of size less than na, and we pay na additive error for every such
cluster. Second, this technique only succeeds with polynomially small probability, and boosting
the confidence using repetitions causes the privacy parameters to degrade.
We show that it is possible to boost the success probability of the above strategy without
degrading the privacy parameters. To that end, we apply the repetitions to disjoint subsamples of
the input points, and show that the subsampling process will not incur a poly(n) error. In order
to “capture” smaller clusters, we apply the above strategy repeatedly, where in every iteration we
exclude from the computation the closest input points to the set of centers that we have already
identified. We show that this technique allows to “capture” much smaller clusters. By combining
this with the techniques of Balcan et al. and Gupta et al. for privately choosing k centers out of
Y , we get our new construction for k-means in the centralized model of differential privacy (see
Table 1).
5
1.4.1 A construction for the local model
Recall that the algorithm of Gupta et al. (the private variant of the local search) applies the
exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [35] in order to privately choose a replacement
center in every step. This use of the exponential mechanism is tailored to the centralized model,
and it is not clear if the algorithm of Gupta et al. can be implemented in the local model. In
addition, since the local search algorithm is iterative with a relatively large number of iterations
(roughly k log n iterations), a local implementation of it, if exists, may have a large number of
rounds of interaction between the users and the untrusted server.
To overcome these challenges, in our locally private algorithm for the k-means we first identify
a set of candidate centers Y (in a similar way to the centralized construction). Afterwards, we
estimate the weight of every candidate center, where the weight of a candidate center y is the
number of input points x ∈ S s.t. y is the nearest candidate center to x. We show that the
weighted set of candidate centers can be post-processed to obtain an approximation to the k-means
of the input points. In order to estimate the weights we define a natural extension of the well-
studied heavy-hitters problem under LDP, which reduces our incurred error. This results in our
new construction for k-means in the local model of differential privacy (see Table 1).
1.4.2 Private coresets
A coreset [1] of set of input points S is a small (weighted) set of points P that captures some
geometric properties of S. Coresets can be used to speed up computations, since if the coreset P is
much smaller than S, then optimization problems can be solved much faster by running algorithms
on P instead of S. In the context of k-means, the geometric property that we want P to preserve
is the k-means cost of every possible set of centers. That is, for every set of k centers D ⊆ Rd
we want that costP (D) ≈ costS(D) (where in costP (D) we multiply each distance by the weight
of the corresponding point). Coresets for k-means and k-medians have been the subject of many
recent papers, such as [17, 23, 26, 27, 10, 18]. Private coresets for k-means and k-medians have
been considered in [22] and in [24]. We show that our techniques result in new constructions for
private coresets for k-means and k-medians, both for the centralized and for the local model of
differential privacy. In the local model, this results in the first private coreset scheme with provable
utility guarantees. In the centralized model, our new construction achieves significantly improved
error rates over the previous state-of-the-art.
2 Preliminaries
In k-means clustering we aim to partition n points into k clusters in which each point x belongs to
the cluster whose mean is closest to x. Formally, for a set of points S ∈ (Rd)n and a set of centers
C ⊆ Rd, the cost of C w.r.t. the points S is defined as
costS(C) =
∑
x∈S
min
c∈C
‖x− c‖22.
For a weighted set S = {(x1, α1), . . . , (xn, αn)} ∈ (Rd × R)n, the weighted cost is
costS(C) =
∑
(x,α)∈S
α ·min
c∈C
‖x− c‖22.
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Definition 2.1 (k-means). Let S be a (weighted or unweighted) finite set of points in Rd. A set
C∗ of k centers in Rd is called k-means of S if it minimizes costS(C) over every such set C.
For a set of points S ∈ (Rd)n we use OPTS to denote the cost of the k-means of S. That is,
OPTS = min
C⊆Rd
|C|=k
{costS(C)}.
Moreover, for a set of points S ∈ (Rd)n and a set of centers Y ⊆ Rd we write OPTS(Y ) to denote
the lowest possible cost of k centers from Y . That is,
OPTS(Y ) = min
C⊆Y
|C|=k
{costS(C)}.
Definition 2.2 (Approximated k-means). Let S be a (weighted or unweighted) finite set of points
in Rd. A set C of k centers in Rd is a (γ, η)-approximation for the k-means of S if
costS(C) ≤ γ ·OPTS +η.
2.1 Preliminaries from differential privacy
Consider a database where each entry contains information pertaining to one individual. An algo-
rithm operating on databases is said to preserve differential privacy if a change of a single record
of the database does not significantly change the output distribution of the algorithm. Intuitively,
this means that individual information is protected: whatever is learned about an individual could
also be learned with her data arbitrarily modified (or without her data at all).
Definition 2.3 (Differential Privacy [20]). Two databases S, S′ ∈ Xn are called neighboring if they
differ in at most one entry. A randomized algorithm M : Xn → Y is (ε, δ) differentially private if
for every two neighboring datasets S, S′ ∈ Xn and every T ⊆ Y we have
Pr[M(S) ∈ T ] ≤ eε · Pr[M(S′) ∈ T ] + δ,
where the probability is over the randomness of M .
2.1.1 The Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms
The most basic constructions of differentially private algorithms are via the Laplace and Gaussian
mechanisms as specified in the following theorems.
Definition 2.4 (Lp-Sensitivity). A function f mapping databases to Rd has Lp-sensitivity λ if
‖f(S)− f(S′)‖p ≤ λ for all neighboring S, S′.
Theorem 2.5 (Laplace mechanism [20]). A random variable is distributed as Lap(b) if its prob-
ability density function is h(y) = 12b exp(− |y|b ). Let ε > 0, and let f : Un → Rd be a function
of L1-sensitivity λ. The mechanism A that on input S ∈ Un outputs f(S) +
(
Lap(λε )
)d
is (ε, 0)-
differentially private. Moreover,
Pr
[
‖A(S)− f(S)‖∞ > ∆
]
≤ d · exp
(
−ε∆
λ
)
.
Theorem 2.6 (Gaussian Mechanism [19]). Let ε, δ ∈ (0, 1), and assume f : Un → Rd has L2-
sensitivity λ. Let σ ≥ λε
√
2 ln(1.25/δ). The mechanism that on input S ∈ Un outputs f(S) +(N (0, σ2))d is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
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2.1.2 Noisy average of vectors in Rd
Consider the task of privately estimating the average of n vectors in the d-dimensional ball B(0,Λ).
The Gaussian mechanism (Theorem 2.6) allows for privately estimating this average with additive
L2 error ≈ Λ·
√
d
εn . In some cases, we could relax the dependency on Λ using the following theorem.
Theorem 2.7 ([40]). Let β, ε, δ > 0. There exists an efficient (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm
that takes a database S ∈ (Rd)n and a parameter r. The algorithm outputs a point y ∈ Rd such
that if diam(S) ≤ r then with probability at least (1− β) it holds that∥∥∥∥∥y − 1n∑
x∈S
x
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ O
(
r
εn
ln
(
nd
β
)√
ln
(
1
δ
))
.
Importantly, differential privacy is guaranteed to hold even if diam(S) > r.
Let 0 < α < 1 be a parameter, and observe that if n &
√
d
αε then the algorithm from the theorem
above returns (w.h.p.) an estimation for the average of S with L2 error at most αr.
2.1.3 Private k-means and candidate centers
In the discrete version of the k-means clustering problem, there is a fixed and finite subset Y ⊆ Rd,
which we call candidate centers. Given a set of points S ∈ (Rd)n our goal is to identify a subset
C ⊆ Y of size k with the lowest possible cost. That is, instead of searching for k centers in Rd,
we are searching for k centers in Y , and our runtime is allowed to depend polynomially on |Y |. As
was shown by Gupta et al. [25] and Balcan et al. [8], it is possible to privately approximate this
discrete version of the problem by constructing a differentially private variant of the local search
algorithm [32].
Theorem 2.8 ([25, 8]). Let β, ε, δ > 0 and k ∈ N, and let Y ⊆ Rd be a finite set centers. There
exists an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm that takes a database S containing n points from the
d-dimensional ball B(0,Λ), and outputs a subset D ⊆ Y of size |D| = k s.t. with probability at least
(1− β) we have that
costS(D) ≤ O(1) ·OPTS(Y ) +O
(
k1.5Λ2
ε
log
(
n|Y |
β
)√
log(n) · log
(
1
δ
))
.
In [25, 8] the above theorem is stated slightly differently, for pure (ε, 0)-differential privacy. The
variant stated in Theorem 2.8 results from the stronger composition properties of (ε, δ)-differential
privacy (see [21]).
2.2 Locality sensitive hashing
A locality sensitive hash function aims to maximize the probability of a collision for similar items,
while minimizing the probability of collision for dissimilar items. Formally,
Definition 2.9 ([30]). Let M be a metric space, and let r>0, c>1, 0≤q<p≤1. A family H of
functions mapping M into domain U is an (r, cr, p, q) locality sensitive hashing family (LSH) if for
all x, y ∈ M (i) Prh∈RH[h(x) = h(y)] ≥ p if dM(x, y) ≤ r; and (ii) Prh∈RH[h(x) = h(y)] ≤ q if
dM(x, y) ≥ cr.
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2.3 The Poisson approximation
When throwing n balls into R bins, the distribution of the number of balls in a given bin is
Bin(n, 1/R). As the Poisson distribution is the limit distribution of the binomial distribution when
n/R is fixed and n → ∞, the distribution of the number of balls in a given bin is approximately
Pois(n/R). In fact, in some cases we may approximate the joint distribution of the number of balls
in all the bins by assuming that the load in each bin is an independent Poisson random variable
with mean n/R.
Theorem 2.10 (e.g., [36]). Suppose that n balls are thrown into R bins independently and uniformly
at random, and let Xi be the number of balls in the i
th bin, where 1 ≤ i ≤ R. Let Y1, · · · , YR
be independent Poisson random variables with mean n/R. Let f(x1, · · · , xR) be a non-negative
function. Then,
E [f(X1, · · · , XR)] ≤ e
√
nE [f(Y1, · · · , YR)] .
In particular, the theorem states that any event that takes place with probability p in the
Poisson case, takes place with probability at most pe
√
n in the exact case (this follows by letting f
be the indicator function of that event).
We will also use the following bounds on the tail probabilities of a Poisson random variable:
Theorem 2.11 ([3]). Let X have Poisson distribution with mean µ. For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
Pr[X ≤ µ(1− α)] ≤ e−α2µ/2
Pr[X ≥ µ(1 + α)] ≤ e−α2µ/3.
3 Private k-means – the centralized setting
In this section we present our construction for the centralized model. The main step in the construc-
tion is to identify a set of candidate centers that contains a subset of k centers with low k-means
cost. Consider an input database S, and let u∗1, . . . , u∗k ∈ Rd denote an optimal set of k centers
for S. In Section 3.1 we use the techniques of Nissim and Stemmer [39] in order to identify a set
of candidate centers that contains a “close enough” candidate center to every optimal center u∗j ,
provided that the optimal cluster induced by u∗j is “big enough”. Smaller clusters will be handled
in Section 3.2.
3.1 Reformulating the results of [39]
In this section we present a procedure, named LSH-Procedure, for privately identifying a set of
centers with a small distance to some of the input points. Most of the ideas in the analysis of
this procedure have appeared in the work of Nissim and Stemmer [39] who studied the related
1-Cluster problem. We modify their procedure to output a set of several candidate centers, and
boost the success probability. We will later apply this procedure iteratively in our construction for
approximating the k-means.
We use a family H of (r, cr, p=n−b, q=n−2−a)-locality sensitive hash functions, mapping Rd to a
universe U , for some constants 1 > a > b > 0, r > 0, and c > 1. Such families exist for every choice
of constants 1 > a > b > 0 and r > 0, with c = c(a, b) (see, e.g., [4]). Furthermore, w.l.o.g., we can
assume that the range U of the functions in H is of size |U | ≤ n3. If this is not the case, then we
9
Algorithm LSH-Procedure
Input: Database S ∈ Rd containing n points, number r > 0, failure probability β, privacy param-
eters ε, δ.
Tool used: Family H of (r, cr, p=n−b, q=n−2−a)-locality sensitive hash functions mapping Rd to a
universe U , for some parameters 0 < b < a < 1, and c = c(a, b) > 1.
1. Denote M = 2na ln( 1β ), and randomly partition S into S1, S2, . . . , SM .
2. Sample M hash function h1, . . . , hM ∈ H mapping Rd to U . For (m,u) ∈ [M ]×U define Sm,u
as the multiset containing all elements of Sm that are mapped into u by hm, i.e.,
Sm,u , {x ∈ Sm : hm(x) = u}.
3. Use the Laplace mechanism3 with privacy parameter ε2 to obtain estimations wˆm,u ≈ |Sm,u|
for every (m,u) ∈ [M ]× U . Denote L =
{
(m,u) : wˆm,u ≥ 60ε ln(nβ )
}
.
4. For every (m,u) ∈ L, use the algorithm from Theorem 2.7 on the database Sm,u with privacy
parameters ( ε2 , δ) and cr as a bound on diam(Sm,u) to obtain a point yˆm,u approximating the
average of Sm,u.
5. Output {yˆm,u : (m,u) ∈ L}
can simply apply a (pairwise independent) hash function with range n3 to the output of the locally
sensitive hash function. Clearly, this does not decrease the collision probability of “close” elements
(within distance r), and moreover, this can increase the collision probability of “non-close” elements
(at distance at least cr) by at most n−3 = o(n−2−a) = o(q).
Lemma 3.1. Algorithm LSH-Procedure is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Furthermore, there exists
a constant Γ > 1 such that the following holds. Assume we apply LSH-Procedure to a database
S ∈ (Rd)n with parameters r, β, ε, δ, a, b, and c. Let P ⊆ S be s.t. diam(P ) ≤ r and |P | = t for
some t satisfying
t ≥ Γ
ε
·
√
d · na+b · ln
(
1
β
)
ln
(
n
β
)√
ln
(
1
δ
)
.
The algorithm outputs a set of at most εn/ log n centers, s.t. with probability at least 1 − β a ball
of radius (2c+ 1)r around one of these centers contains all of P .
The proof is very similar to the that of [39]. We include the proof in the appendix for com-
pleteness.
Remark 3.2. We think of a and b as small constants, e.g., a = 0.2 and b = 0.1. Hence, ignoring
logarithmic factors, the above theorem only requires t to be as big as n0.3
√
d/. Smaller constants
a, b result in a bigger (but constant) approximation factor c = c(a, b).
3As described, this step requires runtime of roughly M ·|U | = poly(n). We remark that it is possible to reduce the
runtime to almost linear in n by using more efficient algorithms for computing histograms. See e.g., [13, 16, 44, 9].
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Algorithm Private-Centers
Input: Database S containing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0,Λ), failure probability β,
privacy parameters ε, δ, and additional LSH parameters 0 < b < a < 1, and c = c(a, b) > 1 (as in
Algorithm LSH-Procedure).
1. Initiate C = ∅.
2. For r = Λn ,
2·Λ
n , . . . ,
2i·Λ
n , . . . ,Λ:
Run algorithm LSH-Procedure on the database S with parameters εlogn ,
δ
logn , r, β, a, b, c, and
add the returned set of centers to C.
3. Output C.
Recall that algorithm LSH-Procedure requires an input parameter r that bounds the diameter
of a subset of t input points. The next construction removes the necessity of this input by executing
the LSH-Procedure multiple times with exponentially growing choices for the parameter r.
Lemma 3.3. Algorithm Private-Centers is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Furthermore, there exists
a constant Γ > 1 such that the following holds. Assume we apply Private-Centers to a database
S containing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0,Λ), with parameters β, ε, δ, a, b, c. Let P ⊆ S
be s.t. |P | = t for some t satisfying
t ≥ Γ
ε
·
√
d · na+b · log(n) · ln
(
1
β
)
ln
(
n
β
)√
ln
(
log n
δ
)
.
The algorithm outputs a set of at most εn centers, s.t. with probability at least 1−β a ball of radius
O(diam(P ) + Λn ) around one of these centers contains all of P .
Proof. The privacy guarantees of the algorithm are immediate. As for the utility analysis, recall
that in Step 2 the algorithm applies the LSH-Procedure with exponentially growing choices of r.
Let i∗ be the smallest integer s.t. r∗ = 2
i∗ ·Λ
n ≥ diam(P ). Clearly, r∗ ≤ 2·diam(P )+ Λn . Now consider
the application of LSH-Procedure in Step 2 of algorithm Private-Centers, in which r = r∗. The
statement now follows from Lemma 3.1.
Remark 3.4. Using standard techniques for confidence amplification (applying Private-Centers
with a constant confidence parameter log(1/β) times), the requirement on t in Lemma 3.3 can be
replaced with
t ≥ Γ
ε
·
√
d · na+b · ln
(
1
β
)
ln2(n)
√
ln
(
log n
δ
)
,
at the expense of returning εn log(1/β) centers instead of εn centers. Furthermore, by slightly
increasing the constant a, the requirement on t can be written as
t ≥ Γ
ε
·
√
d · na+b · ln
(
1
β
)√
ln
(
1
δ
)
.
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Algorithm Private-k-Means
Input: Database S containing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0,Λ), failure probability β,
privacy parameters ε, δ, and additional LSH parameters 0 < b < a < 1, and c = c(a, b) > 1 (as in
Algorithm Private-centers).
% Let u∗1, . . . , u
∗
k denote an optimal set of centers for S, and let S
∗
j be the cluster induced by u
∗
j , i.e.,
S∗j = {x ∈ S : j = argmin`‖x−u∗`‖}. For j ∈ [k] let r∗j =
√
2
|S∗j |
∑
x∈S∗j ‖x− u
∗
j‖2, and let P ∗j = B(u∗j , r∗j )∩S∗j .
1. Initiate C = ∅, and denote S1 = S and n1 = n.
% Initiate ASSIGN[j] = ⊥ for every j ∈ [k].
2. For i = 1 to log log n do
(a) Run algorithm Private-Centers on the database Si with parameters
ε
log logn ,
δ
log logn ,
β
k , a, b, c, and add the returned set of centers to C.
% For every j ∈ [k]: if ASSIGN[j] = ⊥ and if ∃uj ∈ C s.t. ‖uj − u∗j‖ ≤ O(r∗j + Λn ), then set ASSIGN[j] = uj .
(b) Let Si+1 ⊆ Si be a subset of Si containing ni+1 = 2(T + 1)wk · na+bi points with the
largest distance to the centers in C, where w = w(n, d, k, β, ε, δ) and T = T (n) will be
specified in the analysis.
% For every j ∈ [k]: if ASSIGN[j] = ⊥ and if P ∗j 6⊆ Si+1, then let pj ∈ P ∗j \Si+1, let uj = argminu∈C‖pj−u‖,
and set ASSIGN[j] = uj .
3. Output C.
% For every j ∈ [k]: if ASSIGN[j] = ⊥, then arbitrarily choose uj ∈ C and set ASSIGN[j] = uj .
3.2 Capturing smaller and smaller clusters
We are now ready to present our construction for the centralized model – algorithm Private-k-Means.
The algorithm privately identifies a polynomial set of candidate centers such that there exists a
subset of k candidate centers with low k-means cost. By the results of Gupta et al. [25] and Balcan
et al. [8], this suffices for privately approximating the k-means of the inputs (see Theorem 2.8).
For readability, we have added inline comments throughout the description of Private-k-Means,
which will be helpful for the analysis. These comments are not part of the algorithm. Let u∗1, . . . , u∗k
denote an optimal set of centers w.r.t. the set of input points S, and let S∗1 , . . . , S∗k ⊆ S be the
clusters induced by these optimal centers, i.e., S∗j ⊆ S is the set of input points whose nearest
optimal center is u∗j . (These optimal centers and clusters are unknown to the algorithm; they are
only used in the inline comments and in the analysis.) Throughout the execution, we use the
inline comments in order to prescribe a feasible (but not necessarily optimal) assignment of the
data points to (a subset of k of) the current candidate centers. Specifically, we maintain an array
ASSIGN, where we write ASSIGN[j] = u (for some center u in our current set of candidate centers) to
denote that all of the points in the optimal cluster S∗j are assigned to the candidate center u. We
write ASSIGN[j] = ⊥ to denote that points in S∗j have not been assigned to a center yet. For every
j we have that ASSIGN[j] = ⊥ at the beginning of the execution, and that ASSIGN[j] is changed
exactly once during the execution, at which point the jth cluster is assigned to a center. In the
analysis we argue that at the end of the execution the resulting assignment has low k-means cost.
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S The input database.
u∗1, . . . , u∗k ∈ Rd An optimal set of centers for S.
S∗1 , . . . , S∗k ⊆ S The clusters induced by u∗1, . . . , u∗k.
r∗1, . . . , r∗k ∈ R≥0 r∗j =
√
2
|S∗j |
∑
x∈S∗j ‖x− u
∗
j‖2.
P ∗1 , . . . , P ∗k P
∗
j = B(u∗j , r∗j ) ∩ S∗j .
Si ⊆ S, i ∈ [log log n] The set of remaining input points during the ith iteration.
ni = |Si|, i ∈ [log log n] The number of remaining input points during the ith iteration.
C The current set of candidate centers.
ASSIGN[j], j ∈ [k] The assignment constructed in the inline comments.
Table 2: Notations for the analysis of algorithm Private-k-Means
Notation. For a point x ∈ S, we write ASSIGN(x) to denote the candidate center to which x is
assigned at a given moment of the execution. That is, ASSIGN(x) = ASSIGN[j], where j is s.t. x ∈ S∗j .
Consider the execution of algorithm Private-k-Means. For readability, we have summarized
some of the notations that are specified in the algorithm in Table 2. In addition, we denote
w =
Γ · √d
ε
· log log(n) · log
(
k
β
)√
log
(
log log n
δ
)
, (1)
where Γ is the constant from Remark 3.4. Consider the following good event:
Event E1 (over the randomness of Private-Centers):
For every i ∈ [log log n] and j ∈ [k], if |P ∗j ∩ Si| ≥ w · na+bi then after Step 2a of the ith
iteration, the set C contains a center uj ∈ C s.t. ‖uj − u∗j‖ ≤ O(r∗j + Λn ).
Claim 3.5. Event E1 occurs with probability at least 1− β.
Proof. By the properties of algorithm Private-Centers (Lemma 3.3), and a union bound over
i ∈ [log log n] and j ∈ [k], Event E1 happens with probability at least 1− β.
The proof continues by showing that whenever event E1 occurs, algorithm Private-k-Means
successfully identifies a “good” set of candidate centers, in the sense that there is a subset of k
candidate centers with low k-means cost w.r.t. the input S. We first show that if E1 occurs then
the number of unassigned points reduces quickly in every iteration.
Claim 3.6. If Event E1 occurs, then for every i ∈ [log log n], before Step 2b of the ith iteration
there are at most 2kw · na+bi unassigned points in S, i.e., |{x ∈ S : ASSIGN(x) = ⊥}| ≤ 2kw · na+bi .
Proof. Observe that every cluster ` with |P ∗` | ≥ w · na+bi is assigned before Step 2b of the ith
iteration, because if P ∗` ⊆ Si then by Event E1 cluster ` is assigned after Step 2a of the ith
iteration, and if P ∗` 6⊆ Si then the assignment must have already occurred before the ith iteration.
Recall that |P ∗` | ≥ 12 |S∗` |, as otherwise less than half of the points in S∗` are within distance r∗` from
u∗` , and so costS∗` ({u∗`}) >
|S∗` |
2 · (r∗` )2 = costS∗` ({u∗`}). Hence, before Step 2b of the ith iteration,
there could be at most 2kw · na+bi unassigned points.
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Notation. For i ∈ [log log n] we denote by Ai ⊆ S and Bi ⊆ S the subset of input points whose
cluster is assigned to a center during the ith iteration in the comments after Step 2a and after
Step 2b, respectively. Observe that A1, B1, . . . , Alog logn, Blog logn are mutually disjoint.
Notation. Recall the optimal centers u∗1, . . . , u∗k and the radiuses r
∗
1, . . . , r
∗
k defined in the first
comment in algorithm Private-k-Means. For a point x ∈ Rd, let u∗(x) denote x’s nearest optimal
center, and r∗(x) its corresponding radius.
Observation 3.7. For every i ∈ [log log n] and for every x ∈ Ai, at the end of the execution we
have
‖x− ASSIGN(x)‖2 ≤ O
(
‖x− u∗(x)‖2 + (r∗(x))2 + Λ
2
n2
)
.
Lemma 3.8. If Event E1 occurs, then for every iteration i ∈ [log log n] and for every x ∈ Bi there
exists a set of input points Q(x) ⊆ S such that
1. For every i ∈ [log log n] and for every x ∈ Bi it holds that |Q(x)| = T , where T = O(log log n).
2. For every i ∈ [log log n] and for every x, y ∈ Bi, if x 6= y then Q(x) ∩Q(y) = ∅.
3. For every i ∈ [log log n] and for every x ∈ Bi, at the end of the execution it holds that
‖x− ASSIGN(x)‖2 ≤ O
‖x− u∗(x)‖2 + (r∗(x))2 + 1
T
∑
q∈Q(x)
‖q − ASSIGN(q)‖2
 .
Proof. Let us focus on the ith iteration. By Claim 3.6, before Step 2b, there could be at most
2k · w · na+bi unassigned points in S. In particular, |Bi| ≤ 2k · w · na+bi . As |Si+1| = ni+1 =
2(T + 1)wk · na+bi , we have that Si+1 contains at least 2Twk · na+bi assigned points (which were
already assigned before the ith iteration). For x ∈ Bi we define Q(x) to be an arbitrary set of T
assigned points from Si+1, such that for all x 6= y ∈ Bi it holds that Q(x) ∩Q(y) = ∅. It remains
to prove item 3 of the lemma.
Notation. We write Qi to denote the union of all sets Q(x) defined during the ith iteration.
That is, Qi =
⋃
x∈Bi Q(x).
Let j be a cluster that is assigned to a center during the ith iteration in the comment following
Step 2b (so S∗j ⊆ Bi). As in the comment, let pj ∈ P ∗j \ Si+1, and uj = argminu∈C‖pj − u‖, where
C is the set of candidate centers at that time. Recall that we set ASSIGN[j] = uj , and observe
that since pj /∈ Si+1, for every q ∈ Qi ⊆ Si+1, we have that ‖pj − uj‖2 ≤ minc∈C ‖q − c‖2. In
particular, since every q ∈ Qi was already assigned to a center before the ith iteration, we have
that ASSIGN(q) ∈ C, and hence ‖pj − uj‖2 ≤ ‖q − ASSIGN(q)‖2.
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Now let x ∈ S∗j . We get that
‖x− ASSIGN(x)‖2 = ‖x− uj‖2 ≤ O
(‖x− u∗j‖2 + ‖u∗j − pj‖2 + ‖pj − uj‖2)
≤ O
‖x− u∗j‖2 + ‖u∗j − pj‖2 + 1T ∑
q∈Q(x)
‖q − ASSIGN(q)‖2

≤ O
‖x− u∗j‖2 + (r∗j )2 + 1T ∑
q∈Q(x)
‖q − ASSIGN(q)‖2
 .
Lemma 3.9. Algorithm Private-k-Means is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Furthermore, if the al-
gorithm is applied to a database S containing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0,Λ), then it
outputs a set of at most εn log( kβ ) centers, s.t. with probability at least 1− β
min
D⊆C
|D|=k
{costS(D)} ≤ O(1) ·OPTS +O
(
T
1
1−a−b · w 11−a−b · k 11−a−b
)
· Λ2,
where w is defined in Equation (1), and T = Θ(log log n).
Proof. We show that the stated bound holds for the assignment described in the inline comments
throughout the algorithm (the array ASSIGN) at the end of the execution. First observe that by
Claim 3.6 and by the fact that there are log log n iterations, at the end of the execution there could
be at most O
(
(2(T + 1)wk)
1
1−a−b
)
unassigned input points. Let us denote the set of unassigned
points as H. The distance from each unassigned point to an arbitrary center is trivially at most
Λ. For every assigned point x, by Observation 3.7 and by Lemma 3.8, either ‖x− ASSIGN(x)‖2 =
O(‖x− u∗(x)‖2 + (r∗(x))2 + Λ2
n2
), or
‖x− ASSIGN(x)‖2 ≤ O
‖x− u∗(x)‖2 + (r∗(x))2 + 1
T
∑
q∈Q(x)
‖q − ASSIGN(q)‖2
 .
Hence,
costS ({ASSIGN[j] : j ∈ [k]}) =
∑
x∈S
‖x− ASSIGN(x)‖2
=
∑
x∈H
‖x− ASSIGN(x)‖2 +
∑
i∈[log logn]
x∈Ai
‖x− ASSIGN(x)‖2 +
∑
i∈[log logn]
x∈Bi
‖x− ASSIGN(x)‖2
≤ O
(
(2(T + 1)wk)
1
1−a−b
)
· Λ2 +
∑
i∈[log logn]
x∈Ai
O
(
‖x− u∗(x)‖2 + (r∗(x))2 + Λ
2
n2
)
+
∑
i∈[log logn]
x∈Bi
O
‖x− u∗(x)‖2 + (r∗(x))2 + 1
T
∑
q∈Q(x)
‖q − ASSIGN(q)‖2

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≤ O
(
(2(T + 1)wk)
1
1−a−b
)
· Λ2 +
∑
x∈S
O
(‖x− u∗(x)‖2 + (r∗(x))2)+ 1
T
∑
i∈[log logn]
x∈Bi
q∈Q(x)
O
(‖q − ASSIGN(q)‖2)
≤ O
(
(2(T + 1)wk)
1
1−a−b
)
· Λ2 +O(1) ·OPTS + 1
T
∑
i∈[log logn]
x∈Bi
q∈Q(x)
O
(‖q − ASSIGN(q)‖2) (2)
Now recall that for every i ∈ [log log n] and for every x 6= y ∈ Bi it holds that Q(x)∩Q(y) = ∅.
Hence, every point q ∈ S contributes at most log log n times to the last summation above. So,
(2) ≤ O
(
(2(T + 1)wk)
1
1−a−b
)
· Λ2 +O(1) ·OPTS +log log n
T
∑
q∈S
O
(‖q − ASSIGN(q)‖2)
For T = Θ(log log n) (large enough) we get that the last term above is at most half of the left
hand side of the inequality, and hence,
costS ({ASSIGN[j] : j ∈ [k]}) ≤ O
(
(2(T + 1)wk)
1
1−a−b
)
· Λ2 +O(1) ·OPTS
Combining Lemma 3.9 with Theorem 2.8 yields the following theorem.
Theorem 3.10. There is an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm that, given a database S contain-
ing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0,Λ), identifies with probability 1−β a (γ, η)-approximation
for the k-means of S, where γ = O(1) and η = poly
(
log(n), log( 1β ), log(
1
δ ), d,
1
ε , k
)
· Λ2.
4 Private k-means – the distributed setting
We begin by describing private computation in the local model where each individual holds her
private information locally, and only releases the outcomes of privacy-preserving computations on
her data. This is modeled by letting the algorithm access each entry xi in the input database
S = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn separately, and only via differentially private local randomizers.
Definition 4.1 (Local Randomizer, LR Oracle [20, 33]). A local randomizer R : X → W is a
randomized algorithm that takes a database of size n = 1. Let S = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn be a database.
An LR oracle LRS(i, R) gets an index i ∈ [n] and a local randomizer R, and outputs a random
value w ∈W chosen according to the distribution R(xi).
Definition 4.2 (Local differential privacy [20, 33]). An algorithm satisfies (ε, δ)-local differential
privacy (LDP) if it accesses the database S only via the oracle LRS with the following restriction:
for all possible executions of the algorithm and for all i ∈ [n], if LRS(i, R1), . . . , LRS(i, R`) are the
algorithm’s invocations of LRS on index i, then the algorithm B(x) = (R1(x), R2(x), . . . , R`(x)) is
(ε, δ)-differentially private.
Local algorithms that prepare all their queries to LRS before receiving any answers are non-
interactive; otherwise, they are interactive. When δ = 0 we omit it, and say that the algorithm
satisfies ε-LDP.
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4.1 Additional preliminaries
We now present additional preliminaries that enable our construction.
4.1.1 Counting queries and histograms with local differential privacy
The most basic task that we can apply in the local differential privacy model is counting. Let
S ∈ {0, 1}n be a database which is distributed among n users (each holding one bit), and consider
the task of estimating the number of users holding a 1. This can be solved privately with error
proportional to 1ε
√
n (see, e.g., [33]). A more general setting is when instead of a binary domain,
every user holds an input item from some (potentially) large domain X. This can be solved using
tools from the recent line of work on heavy hitters in the local model. [28, 12, 11, 15]
Notation. For a database S = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn and a domain element x ∈ X, we use fS(x) to
denote the multiplicity of x in S, i.e., fS(x) = |{xi ∈ S : xi = x}|.
Theorem 4.3 ([28, 12, 11, 15]). Fix β, ε ≤ 1. There exists a non-interactive ε-LDP algorithm
that operates on a (distributed) database S ∈ Y n for some finite set Y , and returns a mapping
fˆ : Y → R such that the following holds. For every choice of y ∈ Y , with probability at least 1− β,
we have that ∣∣∣fˆ(y)− fS(y)∣∣∣ ≤ O(1
ε
·
√
n · log
(
1
β
))
.
For our construction, we will need the following extension of Theorem 4.3. This extension is
obtained from the analysis of [11] with minor modifications. We include the proof in the appendix
for completeness.
Theorem 4.4 (Algorithm GroupHist). Fix β, ε ≤ 1. There exists a non-interactive ε-LDP al-
gorithm that operates on a (distributed) database S ∈ Y n for some finite set Y , and returns a
mapping fˆ : Y → R such that the following holds. For every choice of a subset Q ⊆ Y with weights
σ : Q→ [0, 1], with probability at least 1− β, we have that∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y∈Q
fˆ(y) · σ(y)−
∑
y∈Q
fS(y) · σ(y)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ O
(
1
ε
·
√
|Q| · n · log
(
1
β
))
.
4.1.2 Algorithm LDP-GoodCenter
Let a > b > 0 and c > 1 be s.t. for every r > 0 there exists family H (r, cr, p=n−b, q=n−2−a)-sensitive
hash functions mapping Rd to a universe U . The next theorem follows from the results of Nissim
and Stemmer [39] with minor modifications, where the constants a, b, c in the theorem depend on
the LSH family that the algorithm is instantiated with.
Theorem 4.5 (Algorithm LDP-GoodCenter [39]). There exists an ε-LDP algorithm that uses a
constant number of interactions with the users, such that the following holds. Let S = (x1, . . . , xn)
be a database containing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0,Λ), and let P ⊆ S be a fixed subset
(unknown to the algorithm) such that for a global constant Γ
|P | ≥ Γ
ε
· n 23 +a+b · d1/3 · log(dn) · log1/3
(
1
β
)
.
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The algorithm outputs a set Y of O
(
ε · n1/3+a/ log1/3(n/β)
)
vectors in Rd s.t. with probability at
least 1−β there exists a vector y ∈ Y such that the ball of radius 5c ·diam(P )+ Λn around y contains
all of P .
4.2 An LDP protocol for k-means
Algorithm LDP-k-Means
Input: Failure probability β, privacy parameter ε, and additional LSH parameters 0 < b < a < 1
and c = c(a, b) > 1.
Setting: Each player i ∈ [n] holds a point xi in the d-dimensional ball B(0,Λ). Define S =
(x1, . . . , xn).
1. Apply algorithm LDP-GoodCenter (Theorem 4.5) on the database S with the privacy param-
eter ε2 . Obtain a set of L = O
(
ε · n1/3+a/ log1/3(n/β)
)
vectors: Y = {y1, . . . , yL}.
2. For every y ∈ Y let cy denote the number of input points (from S) whose closest point in Y
is y. That is, cy = |{x ∈ S : y = argminy′∈Y ‖x− y′‖}|. Denote B = {(y, cy) : y ∈ Y }.
3. Apply algorithm GroupHist (Theorem 4.4) on the database S with the privacy parameter ε2
to obtain for every y ∈ Y an estimation cˆy for cy.
% In more details, first every user i (holding an input xi ∈ Rd) identifies the center yi ∈ Y with minimal
distance to xi. This defines a modified (distributed) database S
′ = (y1, . . . , yn). Then, algorithm GroupHist
is applied to this modified database, and returns a mapping fˆ : Y → R. The weights cˆy are computed as
cˆy = fˆ(y). In the analysis we will use the additional properties of GroupHist.
4. Let Bˆ = {(y, cˆy) : y ∈ Y }.
5. Let Cˆ be a (non-private) approximation to the k-means of Bˆ.
6. Return Cˆ.
Similarly to our construction for the centralized model, we will design an algorithm for approx-
imating the k-means by first identifying a set of candidate centers, and then choosing a subset
of k of them with low k-means cost. However, the techniques of Gupta et al. and Balcan et al.
(for choosing the subset of k candidate centers) do not directly apply to the local model. Instead,
after obtaining the set of candidate centers Y , we privately assign (noisy) weights to the candidate
centers, where the weight of y ∈ Y is the number of input points whose nearest candidate center
is Y . We then show that this information (the set of candidate centers with their weights) can be
post-processed to obtain an approximation to the k-means of the input points.
Consider the execution of algorithm LDP-k-Means, and consider the notations specified in Ta-
ble 3.
Claim 4.6. For every set of centers D ⊆ Rd we have costB(D) ≤ 3 · costS(Y ∗S ) + 3 · costS(D).
Proof. For a point x and a set of centers C, let C(x) be the center in C which is closest to x. So,
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S The input database.
Y The set of L centers chosen on Step 1.
B = {(y, cy)}y∈Y The weighted set of points defined on Step 2.
Bˆ = {(y, cˆy)}y∈Y The weighted set of points defined on Step 4.
Y ∗S ⊆ Y A subset of k centers from Y that minimizes costS(·).
Y ∗B ⊆ Y A subset of k centers from Y that minimizes costB(·).
Y ∗
Bˆ
⊆ Y A subset of k centers from Y that minimizes costBˆ(·).
Table 3: Notations for the analysis of algorithm LDP-k-Mean
for every set of centers D ⊆ Rd we have
costB(D) =
∑
y∈Y
cy · ‖y −D(y)‖2
=
∑
x∈S
‖Y (x)−D(Y (x))‖2
≤
∑
x∈S
‖Y (x)−D(x)‖2
≤
∑
x∈S
(‖Y (x)− x‖+ ‖x−D(x)‖)2
≤
∑
x∈S
(
3 · ‖Y (x)− x‖2 + 3 · ‖x−D(x)‖2)
≤ 3 · costS(Y ∗S ) + 3 · costS(D).
Claim 4.7. For every set of centers D ⊆ Rd we have costS(D) ≤ 3 · costS(Y ∗S ) + 3 · costB(D).
Proof.
costS(D) =
∑
x∈S
‖x−D(x)‖2
≤
∑
x∈S
‖x−D(Y (x))‖2
≤
∑
x∈S
(‖x− Y (x)‖+ ‖Y (x)−D(Y (x))‖)2
≤
∑
x∈S
(
3 · ‖x− Y (x)‖2 + 3 · ‖Y (x)−D(Y (x))‖2)
≤ 3 · costS(Y ∗S ) + 3 · costB(D).
Theorem 4.8. Algorithm LDP-k-Means satisfies ε-LDP and uses a constant number of inter-
actions with the users. In addition, with probability at least 1 − β the algorithms returns a
(γ, η)-approximation for the k-means of the (distributed) data points, where γ = O(1) and η =
O
(
k2·Λ2
ε · n
2
3
+a+b · d1/3 · log(dn) · log1/3
(
k
β
))
.
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Proof. The privacy properties of algorithm LDP-k-Means are immediate (follows from composition).
We now proceed with the utility analysis. Consider the following event:
Event E1 (over the randomness of algorithm LDP-GoodCenter):
costS(Y
∗
S ) ≤ O(1) ·OPTS +O
(
k · t · Λ2) ,
where t , O
(
1
ε · n
2
3
+a+b · d1/3 · log(dn) · log1/3
(
k
β
))
.
Let u∗1, . . . , u∗k ∈ Rd denote an optimal set of centers for S, and let S∗j be the cluster induced by
u∗j , i.e., S
∗
j = {x ∈ S : j = argmin`‖x − u∗`‖}. For j ∈ [k] let r∗j =
√
2
|S∗j |
∑
x∈S∗j ‖x− u
∗
j‖2, and let
P ∗j = B(u∗j , r∗j ) ∩ S∗j .
Fix j such that |P ∗j | ≥ t. By the properties of algorithm LDP-GoodCenter (Theorem 4.5), with
probability at least 1− βk , there exists a center y(j) ∈ Y s.t. a ball of radius O(r∗j + Λn ) around y(j)
contains all of P ∗j . Using the union bound, this is the case for every such j simultaneously with
probability at least 1− β. We continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case. Now, for
every j s.t. |P ∗j | < t, let y(j) be an arbitrary center in Y , and denote D = {y(1), . . . , y(k)} ⊆ Y . We
establish an upper bound on the cost of D (w.r.t. the input points S) by prescribing a feasible (but
not necessarily optimal) assignment of the data points to the centers in D: Every point x ∈ S is
assigned to the center y(j), where j is such that x ∈ S∗j . We have that
costS(D) ≤
∑
j∈[k]
∑
x∈S∗j
∥∥∥x− y(j)∥∥∥2
≤ k · t · Λ2 +
∑
j∈[k]:
|P ∗j |≥t
∑
x∈S∗j
∥∥∥x− y(j)∥∥∥2
≤ k · t · Λ2 +
∑
j∈[k]:
|P ∗j |≥t
∑
x∈S∗j
(∥∥x− u∗j∥∥+ ∥∥∥u∗j − y(j)∥∥∥)2
≤ k · t · Λ2 +
∑
j∈[k]:
|P ∗j |≥t
∑
x∈S∗j
(∥∥x− u∗j∥∥+O(r∗j + Λn
))2
≤ k · t · Λ2 +
∑
j∈[k]:
|P ∗j |≥t
∑
x∈S∗j
[
O
(∥∥x− u∗j∥∥2)+O ((r∗j )2)+O(Λ2n2
)]
≤ k · t · Λ2 +
∑
j∈[k]:
|P ∗j |≥t
∑
x∈S∗j
O (∥∥x− u∗j∥∥2)+O
 1
|S∗j |
∑
x˜∈S∗j
‖x˜− u∗j‖2
+O(Λ2
n2
)
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= k · t · Λ2 +
∑
j∈[k]:
|P ∗j |≥t
∑
x∈S∗j
O
(∥∥x− u∗j∥∥2)+ ∑
x∈S∗j
O
(‖x− u∗j‖2)
+O(Λ2
n
)
= O
(
k · t · Λ2)+O(1) ·OPTS .
In particular, Event E1 happens with probability at least 1− β.
Event E2 (over the randomness of algorithm GroupHist):
For every subset D ⊆ Y of size k we have
∣∣costB(D)− costBˆ(D)∣∣ ≤ O
(
k · Λ2
ε
·
√
|Y | · n · log
(
n
β
))
.
Fix a subset D = (d1, . . . , dk) ⊆ Y , and let GD1 , . . . , GDk denote an optimal partition of the
(weighted) points in Y , assigning them to the centers in D. That is, for every j ∈ [k] and y ∈ GDj
we have that dj ∈ argmind∈D‖y − d‖. Fix j ∈ [k]. By the properties of algorithm GroupHist
(Theorem 4.4), with probability at least 1− β
k·nk we have that∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y∈GDj
(cy − cˆy) · ‖y − dj‖2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ O
(
Λ2
ε
·
√
|GDj | · kn · log
(
n
β
))
.
Using the union bound, this holds simultaneously for every j ∈ [k] and every subset D ⊆ Y of size
k with probability at least 1−β. We now show that Event E2 occurs in this case. Indeed, for every
such D ⊆ Y we have
costB(D) =
∑
j∈[k]
∑
y∈GDj
cy · ‖y − dj‖2
=
∑
j∈[k]
∑
y∈GDj
cˆy · ‖y − dj‖2 +
∑
j∈[k]
∑
y∈GDj
(cy − cˆy) · ‖y − dj‖2
= costBˆ(D) +
∑
j∈[k]
∑
y∈GDj
(cy − cˆy) · ‖y − dj‖2
≤ costBˆ(D) +
∑
j∈[k]
O
(
Λ2
ε
·
√
|GDj | · kn · log
(
n
β
))
= costBˆ(D) +O
Λ2
ε
·
√
kn · log
(
n
β
)
·
∑
j∈[k]
√
|GDj |

≤ costBˆ(D) +O
(
k · Λ2
ε
·
√
|Y | · n · log
(
n
β
))
,
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where the last inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (and by recalling that
∑
j |GDj | =
|Y |). The analysis for the reverse direction is identical. This shows that Event E2 happens with
probability at least 1− β. We continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case.
We are now ready to complete the proof. On Step 5 of algorithm LDP-k-Means we identify
a non-private approximation Cˆ for the k-means of Bˆ.4 Together with Event E2 (stating that
costB(D) ≈ costBˆ(D) for every subset D ⊆ Y of size k) we get that
costB
(
Cˆ
)
≤ O(1) ·OPTB(Y ) +O
(
k2 · Λ2
ε
·
√
|Y | · n · log
(
n
β
))
= O(1) · costB (Y ∗B) +O
(
k2 · Λ2
ε
·
√
|Y | · n · log
(
n
β
))
.
Our goal is to bound costS
(
Cˆ
)
. By Claim 4.7,
costS
(
Cˆ
)
≤ 3 · costS (Y ∗S ) + 3 · costB
(
Cˆ
)
≤ 3 · costS (Y ∗S ) +O(1) · costB (Y ∗B) +O
(
k2 · Λ2
ε
·
√
|Y | · n · log
(
n
β
))
≤ 3 · costS (Y ∗S ) +O(1) · costB (Y ∗S ) +O
(
k2 · Λ2
ε
·
√
|Y | · n · log
(
n
β
))
, (3)
where the last inequality is because Y ∗S ⊆ Y , and Y ∗B minimizes costB(·) over every subset of Y of
size k. Now, by Claim 4.6 we have that
(3) = O(1) · costS (Y ∗S ) +O
(
k2 · Λ2
ε
·
√
|Y | · n · log
(
n
β
))
(4)
Finally, by Event E1, and be recalling that |Y | = O
(
ε · n1/3+a/ log1/3(n/β)
)
, we have
(4) ≤ O(1) ·OPTS +O
(
k2 · Λ2
ε
· n 23 +a+b · d1/3 · log(dn) · log1/3
(
k
β
))
.
5 Private coresets for k-means
Let S be a set of input points. A coreset of S is a small (weighted) set of points P that captures
some geometric properties of S. In the context of k-means, the geometric property that we want
4A technical issue here is that Bˆ might contain negative weights. We are not aware of a result for directly
approximating the k-means of a set of points with negative weights. One option is to replace negative weights with
zero, but that would cause our bound on the additive error to increase significantly, roughly from n2/3 to n3/4
(because negative weights can cancel out other “overly positive” weights). In the appendix we show that the fact
that costBˆ(·) ≈ costB(·) can be leveraged to obtain an approximation to the k-means of Bˆ and of B. Specifically, we
will apply (a variant of) the local search algorithm to the weighted set Bˆ and analyze the algorithm as if it had been
executed on B. See the appendix for more details.
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P to capture is the k-means cost of every possible choice for k centers. That is, for every set of k
centers D ⊆ Rd we want that costP (D) ≈ costS(D). Formally,
Definition 5.1 (Coreset for k-means). Let S be a finite set of points in Rd. A finite set of weighted
points P ⊆ (Rd × R) is an (γ, η)-coreset of S if for every set of k centers D ⊆ Rd we have
costP (D) ≤ γ · costS(D) + η, and
costS(D) ≤ γ · costP (D) + η.
We are interested in private algorithms for computing coresets. That is, we are seeking for a
differentially private algorithm A that takes a database S ∈ (Rd)n and outputs a (weighted) set P
such that
1. The privacy of the input points in S is preserved; and,
2. The output P allows for approximating the k-means cost of every choice for k centers (w.r.t.
the input set S).
In this section we briefly describe how our techniques from the previous sections can be used
to obtain differentially private algorithms for coresets, both for the centralized model and for the
local model of differential privacy.
Consider again Algorithm LDP-k-Means. Given an input set S, we privately identified a set Y
of candidate centers, and privately estimated the weights of every center y ∈ Y , where the weight
of a candidate center y is the number of input points that y is their closest neighbor in Y . We
denoted the resulting assignment of (noisy) weights to the candidate centers as Bˆ, and used B to
denote these points with their “true” weights. In the analysis, we then argued that for every set of
k centers D ⊆ Y we have
costS(D) ≈ costB(D) ≈ costBˆ(D). (5)
With the coreset objective in mind, the above equation suggests that our (privately computed)
Bˆ might actually be a coreset of S. However, Definition 5.1 requires our approximation guarantees
to hold for every choice of k centers from Rd, whereas Equation (5) only holds for every choice
of k centers out of Y (our precomputed set of candidate centers). Actually, the approximation
costS(D) ≈ costB(D) does hold for every D ⊆ Rd (see Claims 4.6 and 4.7), and it is only the
connection between costB(D) and costBˆ(D) that requires attention. Specifically, in the analysis of
Event E2, we first showed that for every fixed set of centers D we have that costB(D) ≈ costBˆ(D),
and then we used the union bound over every possible choice for k centers out of Y . As |Y | =
poly(n), this increased our error by a factor of at most
√
log(nk), which was acceptable. However,
this argument fails if the centers in D come from an infinite domain.
To recover from this difficulty and get a coreset after all, we add a step to the algorithm in which
we we take the set Cˆ of k-centers that approximates the optimal k-means (computed in Step 5),
and recompute approximate weights cˆz for every z ∈ Cˆ. That is, we rerun Step 3 of Algorithm
LDP-k-Means with Cˆ as the set Y and return the (weighted) set Cˆ as our coreset.
Every possible choice D of k centers in Rd induce a partition of Cˆ in which each part consists
of the centers in Cˆ that are closest to a particular element of D. So it suffices to apply the union
bound to every possible partitioning of Cˆ into k groups and argue that the weighted cost of such a
partition (with respect to any set of centers D that induce it) is close to the cost of the entire data
set with respect to D. We obtain the following theorems:
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Theorem 5.2. There is an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm that, given a database S containing
n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0,Λ), identifies with probability 1 − β a (γ, η)-coreset of S,
where γ = O(1) and η = poly
(
log(n), log( 1β ), log(
1
δ ), d,
1
ε , k
)
· Λ2.
Theorem 5.3. There is an ε-LDP algorithm that uses a constant number of interactions with the
users. In addition, with probability at least 1 − β the algorithms returns a (γ, η)-coreset for the
(distributed) data points, where γ = O(1) and η = poly
(
log( 1β ), d,
1
ε , k
)
· n0.67 · Λ2.
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A Proof of Lemma 3.1
The privacy properties of LSH-Procedure are straight forward (follow from composition). We now
proceed with the utility analysis. Let P ⊆ S be s.t. |P | = t and diam(P ) ≤ r, and consider the
following good event.
Event E1 (over partitioning S into S1, . . . , SM):
For every m ∈ [M ] we have |P ∩ Sm| ≥ t2M .
As in Theorem 2.10 (the Poisson approximation), we analyze event E1 in the Poisson case. To
that end, let J1, · · · , JM be independent Poisson random variables with mean tM . Let us say that
m ∈ [M ] is bad if Jm < t2M . Now fix m ∈ [M ]. Using a tail bound for the Poisson distribution
(see Theorem 2.11), assuming that t ≥ 24M ln( eMβ ), we have that m is bad with probability at
most β
eM
√
t
. By a union bound, the probability that a bad m exists is at most β
e
√
t
. Hence, by the
Poisson approximation, we get that Pr[E1] ≥ 1 − β. We proceed with the analysis assuming that
Event E1 occurred.
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Fix again m ∈ [M ]. By the properties of the family H, for every x, y ∈ Rd s.t. ‖x− y‖ ≥ cr we
have that Prhm∈H[hm(x) = hm(y)] ≤ q = n−2−a. Using the union bound we get
Pr
hm∈RH
[hm(x) 6= hm(y) for all x, y ∈ Sm s.t. ‖x− y‖ ≥ cr] ≥ (1− n−a/2).
Let x be an arbitrary point in P ∩ Sm. By linearity of expectation, we have that
E
hm∈H
[|{y ∈ P ∩ Sm : hm(y) 6= hm(x)}|] ≤ |P ∩ Sm| · (1− p) = |P ∩ Sm| · (1− n−b).
Hence, by Markov’s inequality,
Pr
hm∈H
[
|{y ∈ P ∩ Sm : hm(y) 6= hm(x)}| ≥ |P ∩ Sm| · (1− n
−b)
1− n−a
]
≤ 1− n−a.
So,
Pr
hm∈H
[
|{y ∈ P ∩ Sm : hm(y) = hm(x)}| ≥ |P ∩ Sm| ·
(
1− 1− n
−b
1− n−a
)]
≥ n−a.
Simplifying, for large enough n (specifically, for na−b ≥ 2) we get
Pr
hm∈H
[
|{y ∈ P ∩ Sm : hm(y) = hm(x)}| ≥ |P ∩ Sm| · n
−b
2
]
≥ n−a.
As Event E1 has occurred, we get
Pr
hm∈H
[
|{y ∈ P ∩ Sm : hm(y) = hm(x)}| ≥ t · n
−b
4M
]
≥ n−a.
We have established that with probability at least n−a/2 over the choice of hm ∈ H in Step 2
the following events occur:
(E2) For every x, y ∈ Sm s.t. ‖x− y‖ ≥ cr it holds that hm(x) 6= hm(y); and,
(E3) At least
t·n−b
4M points from P ∩ Sm are mapped into the same value by hm.
Now recall that on Step 2 we choose M independent hash functions (h1, . . . , hM ). Hence, for
M ≥ 2na ln( 1β ), with probability at least 1−β there exists m∗ ∈ [M ] for which events E2, E3 occur.
In such a case, we get that by E3 there is a hash value u
∗ s.t.
|Sm∗,u∗ | ≥ |{y ∈ P ∩ Sm∗ : hm∗(y) = u∗}| ≥ t · n
−b
4M
,
and furthermore, by E2, for every x, y ∈ Sm s.t. hm∗(x) = hm∗(y) = u∗ we have that ‖x− y‖ ≤ cr.
We continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case.
In Step 3 we use the Laplace mechanism to obtain estimations wˆm,u ≈ |Sm,u| for every (m,u) ∈
[M ]×U , and to construct a list L ⊆ [M ]×U that contains all pairs (m,u) with large estimations.
Recall that, w.l.o.g., we have that |U | ≤ n3. Hence, by the properties of the Laplace mechanism
(Theorem 2.5), with probability at least 1−β, all of our estimations are accurate to within 30ε ln(nβ ).
Thus, assuming that t·n
−b
4M ≥ 90ε ln(nβ ), we have that (m∗, u∗) ∈ L. (As a side note, observe that
there could be at most εn/ ln(nβ ) elements in L, which bounds the size of the output.)
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Denote the average of the points in Sm∗,u∗ as y
∗, and observe that by E2, a ball of radius cr
around y∗ contains all of Sm∗,u∗ . In Step 4 we use the algorithm from Theorem 2.7 to compute
the noisy average yˆm∗,u∗ of Sm∗,u∗ . The noise magnitude reduces with the size of the set |Sm∗,u∗ |
(recall that |Sm∗,u∗ | ≥ t·n−b4M ), and for t ≥ 4Mnb · 1152
√
d
ε/2 ln
(
4n
β
)√
ln
(
16
δ
)
, with probability at least
(1 − β) we have that ‖y∗ − yˆm∗,u∗‖ ≤ cr. In such a case we have that a ball of radius 2cr around
yˆm∗,u∗ contains all of Sm∗,u∗ , and in particular, contains some of the points from P . Hence, as P is
of diameter r, we get that a ball of radius (2c+ 1)r around yˆm∗,u∗ contains all of P .
All in all, with probability at least 1− 4β we have that the output on Step 5 is a set of centers
{yˆm,u : u ∈ L} such that a ball of radius (2c+ 1)r around one of these centers contains all of P .
B Algorithm GroupHist
In this section we present the proof of Theorem 4.4. The analysis is almost identical to the analysis
of [11]. We include the details here for completeness. We first restate Theorem 4.4.
Theorem B.1 (Algorithm GroupHist). Fix β, ε ≤ 1. There exists a non-interactive ε-LDP algo-
rithm that operates on a (distributed) database S ∈ Y n for a finite set Y and returns a mapping
fˆ : Y → R such that the following holds. For every choice of a subset Q ⊆ Y with weights
σ : Q→ [0, 1], with probability at least 1− β, we have that∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y∈Q
fˆ(y) · σ(y)−
∑
y∈Q
fS(y) · σ(y)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ O
(
1
ε
·
√
|Q| · n · log
(
1
β
))
.
The protocol, GroupHist, uses the following simple local randomizer R.
Algorithm R: Basic Randomizer
Inputs: x ∈ {±1}, and privacy parameter ε.
1. Generate and return a random bit y =
{
x w.p. eε/(eε + 1)
−x w.p. 1/(eε + 1)
Algorithm GroupHist
Public randomness: Uniformly random matrix Z ∈ {±1}s×n, where s = |Y |. Each row of Z is
accessed by an element y ∈ Y .
Setting: Each player i ∈ [n] holds a private value yi ∈ Y . Define S = (y1, · · · , yn).
Define S˜ = (y˜1, · · · , y˜n) where y˜i = Z [yi, i].
1. For i ∈ [n] let zi ← LRS˜(i,R).
2. For every y ∈ Y , define fˆ(y) = eε+1eε−1 ·
∑
i∈[n] zi · Z[y, i].
3. Output fˆ(·).
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Proof. Fix Q ⊆ Y and σ : Q→ [0, 1]. We start by analyzing the expectation of ∑y∈Q σ(y) · fˆ(y):
E
∑
y∈Q
σ(y) · fˆ(y)
 = E
∑
y∈Q
σ(y) ·
eε + 1
eε − 1 ·
∑
i∈[n]
yi · Z[y, i]

=
eε + 1
eε − 1 ·
∑
y∈Q
σ(y) ·
∑
i∈[n]
E
[
zi · Z[y, i]
]
=
eε + 1
eε − 1 ·
∑
y∈Q
σ(y) ·
 ∑
i∈[n]:yi=y
E
[
zi · Z[y, i]
]
+
∑
i∈[n]:yi 6=y
E
[
zi · Z[y, i]
]
=
eε + 1
eε − 1 ·
∑
y∈Q
σ(y) ·
 ∑
i∈[n]:yi=y
eε − 1
eε + 1
+
∑
i∈[n]:yi 6=y
0

=
∑
y∈Q
σ(y) · fS(y).
That is,
∑
y∈Q σ(y) · fˆ(y) can be expressed as the sum of |Q| · n independent random variables
with expectation
∑
y∈Q σ(y) · fS(y). The theorem now follows from the Hoeffding bound.
Remark B.2. For the analysis above it suffices that the entries Z are only k-wise independent, for
k = O
(
log( 1β )
)
. See, e.g., [42] for a statement of the Hoeffding bound for variables with limited
independence.
C Non-private approximation for k-means clustering [32, 25, 8]
In Section 4 we used a non-private algorithm for approximating the k-means of a weighted set of
points Bˆ, with possibly negative weights. We are not aware of a result for directly approximating
the k-means of a set of points with negative weights. However, in our case the set Bˆ is not arbitrary,
in the sense that Bˆ is “close” to a set of points B with non-negative weights. This fact can be
leveraged to obtain an approximation to the k-means of Bˆ, e.g., by modifying the algorithm of [32]
using the techniques of [25, 8]. We include their analysis here for completeness. We remark that
the presentation here does not attempt to optimize constants, and refer the reader to [32, 25, 8] for
a more detailed account.
Lemma C.1 ([32]). Let S ∈ (Rd)n be a set of points, let Y ⊆ Rd be a set of centers, and let D ⊆ Y
be a subset of k centers. There exists x ∈ D and y ∈ Y such that
costS(D)− costS(D \ {x} ∪ {y}) ≥ 1
2k
(costS(D)− 256 ·OPTS(Y )) .
Proof. Let D ⊆ Y be a subset of k centers, refereed to as heuristic centers. Let Y ∗ ⊆ Y denote a
set of k optimal centers, s.t. costS(Y
∗) = OPTS(Y ). For each optimal center o ∈ Y ∗, let do ∈ D
denote is closest heuristic center. We say that o is captured by do. Note that each optimal center
is captured by exactly one heuristic center, but each heuristic center may capture any number of
optimal centers. We say that a heuristic center is lonely if it captures no optimal center. The
analysis is based on constructing a set of swap pairs.
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We begin by defining a simultaneous partition of the heuristic centers and the optimal centers
into two sets of groups D1, D2, . . . , Dr and Y
∗
1 , Y
∗
2 , . . . , Y
∗
r for some r, such that |Di| = |Y ∗i | for all i.
For each heuristic center d that captures some number m ≥ 1 of optimal centers, we form a group
of m optimal centers consisting if these captured centers. The corresponding group of heuristic
centers consists of d together with any m − 1 lonely heuristic centers. (See [32] for an illustration
and for more details.)
We generate the swap pairs as follows. For every partition that involves one captured center we
generate a swap pair consisting of the heuristic center and its captured center. For every partition
containing two or more captured centers we generate swap pairs between the lonely heuristic centers
and the optimal centers, so that each optimal center is involved in exactly one swap pair and each
lonely heuristic center is involved in at most two swap pairs. It is easy to verify that:
(1) each optimal center is swapped in exactly once,
(2) each heuristic center is swapped out at most twice, and
(3) if d and o are swapped, then d does not capture any optimal center other than o.
Notations. For a set of points S, a set of centers Z, and a center z ∈ Z, we write NS(z, Z) to
denote the set of points from S that are closer to z than to any other center in Z. For a set of
points S, a set of centers Z, and a point x ∈ S, we write Z(x) to denote the nearest neighbor of x
in Z.
For each swap pair 〈d, o〉 we establish an upper bound on the difference (costS(D \ {d}∪{o})−
costS(D)
)
by prescribing a feasible (but not necessarily optimal) assignment of the data points to
the centers D \ {d} ∪ {o}. First, the data points in NS(o, Y ∗) are assigned to o, implying a change
of ∑
x∈NS(o,Y ∗)
(‖x− o‖2 − ‖x−D(x)‖2) . (6)
Each point x ∈ NS(d,D) \NS(o, Y ∗) has lost d as a center and must be reassigned to a new center.
Since x is not in NS(o, Y
∗) we know that Y ∗(x) 6= o, and hence by property (3) above d does not
capture Y ∗(x). Therefore D(Y ∗(x)), the nearest heuristic center to Y ∗(x), exists after the swap.
We assign x to D(Y ∗(x)). Thus the change due to this reassignment is at most∑
x∈NS(d,D)\NS(o,Y ∗)
(‖x−D(Y ∗(x))‖2 − ‖x− d‖2) . (7)
So, by (6) and (7) we have that
costS(D \ {d} ∪ {o})− costS(D) ≤
∑
x∈NS(o,Y ∗)
(‖x− o‖2 − ‖x−D(x)‖2)
+
∑
x∈NS(d,D)\NS(o,Y ∗)
(‖x−D(Y ∗(x))‖2 − ‖x− d‖2) . (8)
We now want to sum Inequality 8 over over all swap pairs. To that end, recall that each optimal
center is swapped in exactly once, and hence each point x contributes once to the first sum. Also
note that the quantity in the second sum is always non-negative, because D(Y ∗(x)) ∈ D and d is
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the closest center in D to x. Hence, by extending the sum to all x ∈ NS(d,D) we can only increase
its value. Recalling that each heuristic center is swapped in at most twice we have∑
〈d,o〉
(
costS(D \ {d} ∪ {o})− costS(D)
)
≤
∑
x∈S
(‖x− Y ∗(x)‖2 − ‖x−D(x)‖2)+ 2∑
x∈S
(‖x−D(Y ∗(x))‖2 − ‖x−D(x)‖2)
=
∑
x∈S
‖x− Y ∗(x)‖2 − 3
∑
x∈S
‖x−D(x)‖2 + 2
∑
x∈S
‖x−D(Y ∗(x))‖2
= costS(Y
∗)− 3 · costS(D) + 2
∑
x∈S
‖x−D(Y ∗(x))‖2
≤ costS(Y ∗)− 3 · costS(D) + 2
∑
x∈S
(‖x− Y ∗(x)‖+ ‖Y ∗(x)−D(Y ∗(x))‖)2
≤ costS(Y ∗)− 3 · costS(D) + 2
∑
x∈S
(‖x− Y ∗(x)‖+ ‖Y ∗(x)−D(x)‖)2
≤ costS(Y ∗)− 3 · costS(D) + 2
∑
x∈S
(‖x− Y ∗(x)‖+ ‖x− Y ∗(x)‖+ ‖x−D(x)‖)2
= costS(Y
∗)− 3 · costS(D) + 2
∑
x∈S
(
4 · ‖x− Y ∗(x)‖2 + 4 · ‖x− Y ∗(x)‖ · ‖x−D(x)‖+ ‖x−D(x)‖2)
= 9 · costS(Y ∗)− costS(D) + 8
∑
x∈S
‖x− Y ∗(x)‖ · ‖x−D(x)‖
≤ 9 · costS(Y ∗)− costS(D) + 8
√
costS(Y ∗) · costS(D)
≤ 9 · costS(Y ∗)− 1
2
· costS(D),
where for the last inequality we assumed that costS(D) ≥ 256 · costS(Y ∗). So,∑
〈d,o〉
(costS(D)− costS(D \ {d} ∪ {o})) ≥ 1
2
· costS(D)− 9 · costS(Y ∗),
and hence, there must exist a swap pair 〈d, o〉 such that
costS(D)− costS(D \ {d} ∪ {o}) ≥ 1
2k
· costS(D)− 9
k
· costS(Y ∗).
Theorem C.2 ([25, 8]). Let S ∈ (Rd)n be a set of points such that diam(S) ≤ Λ, and let Y ⊆ Rd
be a set of centers. Let f : Y k → R be a function that given a set of k centers D ∈ (Rd)k returns
an arbitrary value such that |f(D)− costS(D)| ≤ ∆. There exists an algorithm that identifies a set
of k centers C ⊆ Y such that costS(C) ≤ O(1) ·OPTS(Y ) +O(Λ2 + k∆), using only oracle access
to the function f (and no other access to S).
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Algorithm NoisyLocalSearch [32, 25, 8]
Settings: Let Y ⊆ Rd be a (known) set of centers, and let S ∈ (Rd)n be a (fixed but unknown)
set of points . The algorithm has oracle access to a function f : Y k → R, where for every subset
D ⊆ Y of size k, the function returns an arbitrary number such that |f(D)− costS(D)| ≤ ∆.
1. Arbitrarily select a subset D(0) ⊆ Y of size k.
2. Denote T = 2k log n.
3. For t = 1, 2, . . . , T : Choose (x, y) ∈ D(t−1)×Y maximizing f (D(t−1))−f (D(t−1) \ {x} ∪ {y}),
and set D(t) ← D(t−1) \ {x} ∪ {y}.
4. Output Z(T ).
Proof. The proof is via the construction of algorithm NoisyLocalSearch. By our assumption on
the function f and by Lemma C.1, every iteration t identifies a swap pair (x, y) such that
costS
(
D(t−1)
)
− costS
(
D(t)
)
= costS
(
D(t−1)
)
− costS
(
D(t−1) \ {x} ∪ {y}
)
≥ 1
2k
· costS
(
D(t−1)
)
− 128
k
·OPTS(Y )− 4∆.
Hence, after T = 2k log n iterations we have that
costS
(
D(T )
)
≤
(
1− 1
2k
)T
· costS
(
D(0)
)
+
(
128
k
·OPTS(Y ) + 4∆
)
·
T−1∑
t=0
(
1− 1
2k
)t
≤
(
1− 1
2k
)T
· n · Λ2 +
(
128
k
·OPTS(Y ) + 4∆
)
· 2k
≤ Λ2 + 256 ·OPTS(Y ) + 8k∆.
33
